

IS COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM A FORM OF GLOBAL WAR?

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Developing theories about counterterrorism and counterterrorism strategy is made more difficult by problems of definitions (what is terrorism?), lack of consensus on the fundamental nature of terrorism (is it an ideology in and of itself, or a tactic?), and differing threat perceptions (is terrorism indeed a global problem?). In this paper, the author argues that the increased lethality, reach, and overall expanded competencies of terrorist groups means that all nations must confront terrorism in concert and without regard to an individual state's threat perception, and while terrorism and counterterrorism indeed do constitute a form of international war, application of military force as the principal counterterrorism measure is not necessarily feasible, suitable, or acceptable.

IS COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM A FORM OF GLOBAL WAR?

In the war against global terrorism . . . (f)reedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy on this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationship and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.¹

—President George W. Bush

The above statement raises the issue of what one exactly means by war in the international context. For the purposes of this paper, I take the phrase “global war” to mean either a war waged around the globe and not limited by geography between two parties, at least one of which is a state, or alternately it could mean a war waged by a coalition or alliance of many nations from around the world against a particular ideology, an individual party, whether a state or transnational force, or an alliance or coalition of such parties. In the first case, “global” refers to the extent of the battle space; in the second, “global” refers to the broad geographic dispersion of the belligerents. The current situation in regard to global terrorism uniquely falls into both definitions. On one hand, a case can be made that there is an international war between the United States and its close allies against the terrorism of the al-Qaeda and associated jihadist networks taking place around the globe, and at the same time one can also argue that there is a war on terrorism as a tactic by many nations around the globe against national, regional and international terrorist groups. The difference between the two views centers on how one views the international terrorist threat. Does terrorism itself, as a tactic or ideology, threaten the security of virtually all nations around the world or is only a threat to a limited number of nations and their interpretation of the world order? This is an important distinction, for if one takes the latter view then it could be claimed

that the war on terrorism is not an international fight requiring the contribution or participation of nations around the globe. The disconnect between these two interpretations of global terrorism has “real world” implications that are very problematic. Many nations publicly and in diplomatic exchanges adhere to the first view, that terrorism taken large poses a fundamental threat to global security and stability. In practice, however, national self-interest in states that have not been a target of direct attack may argue for the second interpretation, that terrorism really only threatens certain other nations. Under this interpretation, it follows that taking too proactive a stance against terrorism broadly defined would bring about the danger of retaliation from terrorist groups that may had been content to ignore a particular country in the first place. As the fundamental duty of governments is the security and stability of the state, and if terrorism is not nor has been a direct threat then it would be counterproductive, the logic goes, to jeopardize domestic security and stability in order to assist in a global war on terrorism. In addition to this realist bias against participating in a global war on terrorism, there is the matter of cost. Actions taken to curb terrorism cost money, and if terrorism is viewed as a distant problem it can easily be deemed a lesser priority than domestic demands on a limited national budget.

In September 2002, the administration of United States President George W. Bush outlined a radically new foreign policy known as the Bush doctrine. “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism -- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”²

The 20th century witnessed great changes in the use and practice of terrorism. Terrorism became the hallmark of a number of political movements stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum. Technological advances such as automatic weapons and electrically- detonated explosives gave terrorists a new mobility and lethality. Terrorism became a tactic not just of insurgent or ideological revolutionary groups, but was also adopted as a state policy of political control by totalitarian regimes as those of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. In those states, arrest, imprisonment, torture, and execution were applied without legal guidance or restraints to create a climate of fear and to encourage adherence to the national ideology and the declared economic, social, and political goals of the state.³

But what is different from the past, when terrorism as a tactic was usually contained within a state, is that today terrorism usually has a major international dimension. It is this international dimension that has brought with it both new concepts of terror and newer and more sophisticated methods of imposing such terror.

Terrorism involves violence, but is it an act of war? To address this issue, I will discuss the definition of terrorism, the changing means of terrorism, and how terrorism has affected the worldwide community before posing the question if global military coalitions can counter the phenomenon of global terrorism? And, finally, I will argue that the world should deal with global terrorism through strengthening regional stability mechanisms and other methods to sustaining the stability of nations and the larger world community.

Definition of Terrorism

Much time has been spent in national legislatures and at international levels on working out a definition of terrorism. The definition of terrorism is something that is beset with many difficulties. Some definitions focus on terrorist organizations' mode of operation. Others emphasize the motivations and characteristic ideologies of individual terrorists. So far there is no absolutely perfect legally and philosophically practical, commonsensical working definition of terrorism agreed to by academicians, politicians, and other professionals. Even when people agree on a definition of terrorism, they sometimes disagree about whether or not the definition can be applied to a particular incident. Hence the statement, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,"⁴ has become one of the most difficult obstacles in defining terrorism. Indeed, Bruce Hoffman noted in his book *Inside Terrorism*,

. . . virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence that is perceived as directed against society -- whether it involves the activities of anti-government dissidents or governments themselves, organized crime syndicates or common criminals, rioting mobs or persons engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics or loan extortionists -- is often labeled terrorism.⁵

For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the *United States Code*, Section 2656f (d). That statute contains the following definitions;

The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.⁶

Fundamentally, terrorism is an act of violence, targeting its attacks on society itself. Terrorist violence is typically directed towards members of the public or a section of the public indiscriminately or at random involving the use of lethal force and is capable of causing extensive damage to properties and inflicting heavy casualties to the civilian population.

Changes in the Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon. It has been with us from the dawn of recorded history. Virtually every country in the world, every civilization has at one time or another suffered the cruelty and the agony of terrorism. The term terrorism may be new, but we can find acts of terrorism taking place more than 2000 years ago. The first known acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetrated by the Zealots, a Jewish sect active during the first century CE. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule of what is today Israel through a campaign mainly involving assassination. Zealot fighters used daggers to attack their enemies in broad daylight, often in crowded market places or on feast days, for people to witness the violence. Thus, like modern terrorists, the Zealots intended to relay a message to the Roman occupation forces and any Jews who collaborated with the invaders.⁷ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, malcontents in Italy, Spain, Russia, and France used terrorism to fight aristocratic governments or to advance (or suppress) "workers' rights."

The forerunners of modern global terrorism can be seen in the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist; whether so intended or not, this terrorist act served as one of the seminal events leading to World War I. Another example is the 1946 bombing of British government offices in Jerusalem by the Zionist *Irgun* organization, beginning a pattern of Mideast violence.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, acts of terror became more common,⁸ and more frequently acquiring an international dimension. Furthermore, the international dimension has brought with it new concepts of terror and new and more sophisticated methods of dealing and supporting terror, whether through new weapons systems or improved communications and more sophisticated financial networks. In addition, the 1960s-1970s saw the evolution of state-sponsored terrorism: Middle East groups received support from the Soviet Union and Arab terrorism against Israel increased. Radical Communist groups such as Japanese Red Army, Italian Red Brigade, and the German Bader Meinhof Gang, plagued Asia and Europe with terrorist acts. Effective police action eventually neutralized the major left-wing terrorist organizations, and the internal problems of the then-Soviet Union reduced that country's support to terrorist groups. Another major source of state-sponsored terrorism, Libya's Muammar al Qaddafi Momar, noted, "By the passage of time, everyone changes, through experience. In the 1970s we supported liberal's movements without knowing which terrorists were and which were not. In the 1980s we began to differentiate between terrorists and those with legitimate political aspirations."⁹ Whether legitimate or not, global terrorism had been allowed to develop structures and competencies that largely allowed for self-support.

In the 1970s-1980s, terrorist groups started working together across international borders, and the world saw the formation of religiously motivated groups such as Hezbollah, Sikh extremists, and *jihadis* in Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹⁰ By the 1990s, these groups were able to demonstrate global reach, while other groups rose up in

countries that had been largely free from terrorist attacks, as illustrated by the following wide-ranging examples of terrorist acts;¹¹

- A series of 13 near-simultaneous car and truck bombings that shook Bombay, India, in February 1993, killing 400 persons and injuring more than 1000 others, in reprisal for the destruction of an Islamic shrine in that country;
- A December 1994 hijacking of an Air France passenger jet by Islamic terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the intended foiled plot to blow up themselves, the aircraft, and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the plane was over Paris, thus causing the flaming wreckage to plunge into the crowded city below.
- A March 1995 Sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, perpetrated by an apocalyptic Japanese religious cult (Aum Shinrikyo) that killed a dozen persons and wounded 5700 others; reportedly the group also planned to carry out identical attacks in the United States.
- The bombing of an Oklahoma City federal office building in April 1995, where 168 persons perished, by two Christian Patriots seeking to foment a nationwide race revolution.
- The wave of bombings unleashed in France by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) between July and October 1995, of metro trains, outdoor markets, cafes, schools, and popular tourist spots, that killed eight persons and wounded more than 180 others.

- The Egyptian Islamic militants who carried out a brutal machinegun and hand-grenade attack on a group of Western tourists outside their Cairo hotel in April 1996 that killed 18.
- The June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 persons perished, by religious militants opposed to the reigning al-Saud regime.
- The unrelenting bloodletting by Islamic extremists in Algeria itself that has claimed the lives of more than an estimated 75,000 persons there since 1992.
- The massacre in November 1997 of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians by terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) at the Temple of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.
- The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Al Qaeda in August 1998 that killed 257 and injured some 5000 others.

The icon of modern terrorism, however, was the September 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda on New York and Washington. It was not the attack alone that caused former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to declare, "We've entered a new security environment, perhaps the most dangerous the world ever known."¹² Rather, it is the nature of the terrorists' means of identifying enemies, the obvious global reach, and the increased potential lethality of terrorist attacks that define the new security environment.

Terrorism's Effects on the Global Community

From the above it can be seen that despite the regional focus of some groups as seen in the Algerian cases, the attacks mostly take place either outside of the terrorist groups' country against another government other than the home government of the

terrorist group or within the country of origin of the terrorist group against targets from a third-party nation. In the case of Al-Qaeda, given its intention to strike the United States everywhere, it is not surprising that its attacks have been on a global scale. The launching of attacks on foreign soil or foreign targets that have in a general sense little connection to the issue by domestically-focused terrorist groups is not as senseless as it appears at first glance. Targeting a more influential or powerful third party nation rather than the home government not only brings about international attention but also may force the victim nation to pressure the home government to negotiate with the terrorist group. The other effect is the economic fallout. Launching attacks on tourists or businessmen from other countries results in tourism and investment being discouraged and thus serve the terrorists' purpose of undermining the government. Thus, what can be seen as a domestic problem of terrorism can easily become an international problem. Of course such tactics can backfire. For example, France's response to the GIA attacks was instead to increase security and sweep up suspected Algerian terrorists from what had been their French sanctuaries.

Following the tragic attacks of September 11, U.S President George W. Bush launched a „war on terror' that was supported by a broad coalition of states drawn from all countries and endorsed by the UN. This appellation implied that such a war would address all fronts of terror.

The UN's attention to terrorism and its root causes has centered on the General Assembly which has categorized several distinct kinds of terrorism according to agent, objectives, methods, or other factors. The types are Non-state Terrorism, State Terrorism, and State-Cum-Non-State Terrorism.¹³

Non-State Terrorism consists of two disparate types. The first is self determination terrorism, claims for independence, autonomy, or cultural expression. This type associated with independence movements against colonial rule gained intensity and legitimacy from the UN principle of self-determination. This category also includes movements fighting for some measure of autonomy against state authorities, for example, The Irish Republican Army (IRA), The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Liberation Tiger of Tamil Elam (LTTE). They are manifestations of the General Assembly's observation that "colonialism, racism, and situations involving mass flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien occupation may give rise to terrorism."¹⁴ The second type of non-state terrorism is "hate terrorism." This includes ethnocentric, racist, Fascist, or similar groups undertaking arson, assassination, lynching, and other violent acts against innocent members of a scapegoat group. The Afrikaan Weerstand Beweging (AWB) in South Africa, neo-Nazi groups in Europe, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNTIA), the Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone (RUF) are examples of such groups driven by a desire to humiliate, and some cases destroy, a target group.¹⁵

State Terrorism can be described as „The continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist, and alien regimes in denying their legitimate right to self determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms."¹⁶ State terrorism can be further distinguished between national and extra-national forms.. National state terrorism may take the form of proactive terrorism, which refers to state action that resorts to terrorist acts to oppress a particular part of the domestic population for political, ideological, religious, or cultural reasons, or acting preemptively against

suspected threats to authority, for example, the Turkish and Iraqi treatment of Kurdish minorities. Extra-national state-sponsored terrorism is directed at noncitizens in foreign lands through support to either non-state or state terrorism.

There are, of course, alternatives to the UN's typology of terrorism. In the Iraqi Army's counter-terrorism course, of which the author is a graduate, terrorism can take the form of criminal terrorism (characterized by the systematic use of terror for material or monetary gain), war terrorism (involving the use of terrorist action in pursuit of war objectives, recognizing the difficulty in distinguishing between terrorist and guerilla actions), and nationalist terrorism (which seeks to establish a separate state for a particular national group. This last sort of terrorism has been among the most successful at winning international sympathy and concessions. Nationalist terror groups have tended to calibrate their use of violence, using enough to rivet world attention but not so much that they alienate supporters abroad or members of their base community. Nationalist terrorism can be difficult to define, since many groups accused of the practice insist that they are not terrorists but freedom fighters.

In addition, there is religious terrorism which seeks to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Examples include the al-Qaeda network, the Palestinian Sunni organization Hamas, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, the radical Jewish groups affiliated with the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, the Israeli extremists Baruch Goldstein (who machine-gunned Muslim worshipers in a Hebron mosque in 1994) and Yigal Amir (who assassinated then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

in 1995), some American white-supremacist militias, and the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult in Japan.¹⁷

No matter what the typology, the increasing use of indiscriminate violence, the increased range of terrorist action, the increased lethality of terrorist actions, and the increasing links between disparate terrorist groups argue that modern terrorism itself, rather than the western response, is what has established terrorism as a global feature. This is highlighted in the 2003 declaration of the Algerian GSPC group: We strongly and fully supported Osama Bin Laden's Jihad against the heretic America and as well we support our brothers in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Chechnya"¹⁸

Terrorist acts are being more frequently perceived as attacks on global society as a whole, and on the democratic institutions that make such a society possible. Under such circumstances, countering (or acquiescing to) terrorism becomes an imperative for every nation.

The 9/11/01 attack on the World Trade Center was a declaration that terrorism was capable of hitting anywhere in the world. President George W. Bush declared that, "We must wage a war against terrorism, and all terrorist groups,"¹⁹ going on to say the struggle "begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."²⁰ The immediate response was a military coalition against terrorism.

Global Military Coalition against Terrorism

After the September 11 attacks the United States formed an unprecedented global coalition against terrorism. One hundred and seventy nine nations around the world have joined the United States in the fight against terrorism, fighting the war on many fronts through diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence, investigative and law

enforcement channels.²¹ The military coalition for the destruction of terrorism encompasses the largest coalition : 136 nations offered some form of military assistance ranging from temporary use of their national military bases to the commitment of combat ground, air and naval forces. Of those 136 nations, 20 countries have collectively deployed troops in Afghanistan. ²² But is it possible to eliminate terrorism by military coalition actions?

In order to eliminate terrorism, we must examine the root causes of terrorism and deal with them. That does not mean giving in to terrorists. Normally, a terrorist group makes up only a very small percentage of the population they claim to represent. To unconditionally accept terrorist demands would be capitulation to the vocal minority over the silent majority. However, most terrorist groups have (and require) political supporters, which attract people who believe in their ideology even if they do not support violence. To fully understand the causes of the terror attacks on the US, one must understand the fundamental perceived grievances that drove that, and any other terrorist attack. A military response conducted without such an understanding might destroy the training camps and eliminate leaders, but such a solution would only be viable in the short run. No purely military campaign being fought now can stop a future bin Laden from building new training camps and launching attacks in the future. To continue the current campaigns in Afghanistan or Iraq over a longer period without addressing core grievances will only serve to make the problem worse (do not forget that Bin Laden was largely a product of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan). I maintain the only solution is to eliminate the motivation behind the people, those who

were looking for training in these terrorist camps in the first place, to understand why they are there.

The disruptive effects of globalization will generate more anti-Western anti-USA terrorism in the global village. The potential for distant conflicts to turn into transnational terrorism will increase (Globalization also has various indirect impacts on patterns of terrorism).²³ The only thing that is certain about the future of terrorism is that patterns of terrorism are going to change; however, there are important structural factors in today's world creating more propitious conditions for terrorism. The threat of al-Qaeda and its global network of militant jihadist are undoubtedly key factors in today's international terrorism. Armed conflicts are another powerful source of transnational terrorism, even if the conflicts remain the same in number, and their potential to become global and internationalized will be increased in a more globalized world.

There will be more nuclear, biological, chemical, programs increasing in the Middle East and North Korea in the coming decade. The likelihood for WMD proliferation to terrorist groups will remain and possibly increase, especially those groups seeking to employ the most deadly weapons they can use including WMD's. Hence, the future of terrorism threats will be determined by technological barriers and weapons availability.²⁴

Transnational crime organizations will continue to grow in diversity in many regions, and the increased global reach to these organizations' networks will provide a lot of advantages for transnational terrorists, in terms of increasing of availability for false ID's, illegal weapons, explosives, military equipment, etc..²⁵

Our world today similar to a ship on the seas, with passengers in first, second, third, and finally, far below the waterline, in fourth class cabins. We need to be concerned about who live in the lower cabins; if we allow a leak in this cabins the ship finally will sink. To much of the world, though, Americans don't even live in a first class cabins; the Americans live in the Captain's cabin, and hence feel they are the Captains of the Ship, but captains unwilling to take responsibility.

Effective Counter Terrorism through Global Stabilization

In order to react and solve any wicked problem, we have to go back to its roots and causes. For instance, Bin Laden and other militant Islamist leaders issued a 1998 manifesto denouncing the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support of Israel, and American sanctions against Iraq. "To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."²⁶ Bin Ladin deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri said on 9 July 2005, "I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media, and that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma"²⁷ By this statement, the root of the problem became clear to everyone. The al Qaeda leadership has successfully argued, at least to the new jihadi recruits, that resistance to the West is a pure act of Muslims' self-defense.

The fight against terrorism is a war with no frontiers, against enemies who know no borders and have no scruples. If we abandon our scruples, we descend to their level. Americans are at war with a transnational terrorist movement and insurgency driven by an ideology of 'hatred and murder'. Americans have largely been fighting this war with arms; al Qaeda has largely been fighting it through ideas. To evaluate the relative efficacy of these two approaches, consider the assessment of former Defense

Secretary Rumsfeld stated: "If I were grading I would say we probably deserved a 'D' or a „D-plus as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today."²⁸

So how, then, should the global war on terrorism be conducted? The best way to start is with President Obama's "strategy on countering terrorism."²⁹

We know that al Qaeda and its extremist allies threaten us from different corners of the globe -- from Pakistan, but also from East Africa and Southeast Asia, from Europe and the Gulf, and that's why we're applying focused and relentless pressure on al Qaeda -- by sharing more intelligence, strengthening the capacity of our partners, disrupting terrorist financing, cutting off supply chains, and inflicting major losses on al Qaeda's leadership.

It should now be clear -- the United States and our partners have sent an unmistakable message: We will target al Qaeda wherever they take root; we will not yield in our pursuit; and we are developing the capacity and the cooperation to deny a safe haven to any who threaten America and its allies.

While this sounds very much like the kinetic (and often unilateral) focus of the Bush administration, President Obama has gone on to say:

The dialogue of civilizations is a discourse across all frontiers, embracing communities who profess and practice different faiths, but have scruples about imposing their values on others. We must talk to and welcome into the concert of civilized communities believers in moral values from all continents, cultures and faiths. The need of the hour is for discourse among the civilized, not a dialogue of the uncivilized deafened by the drumbeats of war."³⁰

The need for a dialogue among civilizations is now greater than before, not less. Those whose vision rises above the obvious differences between ethnic, religious, cultural and social groups, and embraces so much that we all have in common, will not judge a human being simply on a person's looks, language and faith. This is what the dialogue among civilizations is about.

To accomplish this dialogue, the United States needs to recognize:

- the United Nations is the only global platform that we have and the only suitable forum to deal with the new challenges of global challenges, such as international action against terrorism. All actions taken internationally should be within the limits of the UN Charter and should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN funding should be secured, and the UN must be democratized and strengthened at all levels.
- The fight against international terrorism must not lead to the struggle of cultures and religion. It is necessary to ensure the maximum political support of all the democratic forces operating in unstabilized countries in order to strengthen the stability of the region.
- US and other nuclear countries should pursue the efforts for reducing the size of nuclear arsenals in coming decade, including the smaller battlefield weapons that are most susceptible to attack or theft by terrorist.³¹
- "It's a problem to be managed, not to be solved."³² While the flame of terrorism cannot be extinguished it can be reduced through the carefully selected application of response to fit with each situation.
- The Security Council with the help of US should employ a variety of sanctions to pressure state sponsors into stopping their support for terrorism.
- Fully control the WMD development programs made by unbalanced countries, by making it a global issue.
- In winning the world battle of „hearts and minds’, US should reflect a well disposed ‘sincerity’ that they will be everywhere pursuing terrorists regardless of their ideology or their immediate threat to US interests..

A better US foreign policy -- not better spin -- is what is needed. Deeds, not words, are what matter.³³

Conclusion

“The Third World War has started.”³⁴

Global terrorism is becoming more commonplace and has the potential to expand even further. It has become the new face of international war as the power of individuals and transnational groups have been enhanced by the ready availability of technology to all along with mobility provided by global travel. Moreover the decline of many nations into weak governments unable to exert central authority over much of its territories and the fact that terrorist sponsoring nations and terrorist groups are no longer largely controlled by the superpowers of the Cold War means that terrorist groups have more latitude and freedom to operate. The globalized world also means that terrorists groups have the choice of where they want to attack and thus countries not directly involved get caught up in the crossfire. Global terrorism is a war without frontiers that makes no distinction as to whether a nation is a party or has a stake in the conflict or not and thus is an international war for every nation due to the actions of the terrorist who do not respect neutrality or borders.

The fight against international terrorism should be conducted with a scalpel, not with a butcher's axe. The root causes of terrorism must be addressed first. It is important to win the hearts and minds of terrorists and their supporters to discourage them from resorting to terrorism in order to achieve their objectives. Efforts must be made to find ways and means to prevent certain people or governments resorting to terrorism by identifying and removing the cause of their bitterness and anger. The right

strategy to overcome terrorism is not Conventional Warfare. You don't go fox hunting with tanks and cannons.

Global terrorism is indeed a form of international war; it is both a conflict taking place anywhere and everywhere in the world, and involves coalitions made up of members and parties throughout the globe.

Endnotes

¹ Dimitry A. Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 22.

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